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In the following pages we are going to briefly recollect some of Scheler’s main arguments 
concerning the status of “affective life” and to try a sympathetic appraisal of the bearing 
of these theses. after resuming Scheler’s assessment of love and showing its conceptual 
connections with intentionality, spiritual values and sensuous corporeality, we shall 
sketch an account of the ontological and axiological role of love. love turns out to be 
interpretable as a pervasive drive that shapes both natural and cultural history, while 
history, in its most comprehensive sense, is not viewed either as sheer contingency or as 
teleology, but rather as an exploratory cosmological venture.
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max scheler’s analyses represent one of the major contributions to a theory 
of value in the twentieth century. as is well-known, a peculiar role is played 
in his theoretical account by the relation between the affective sphere, the 
axiological ordering and the cognitive dimension. in the following pages we 
are going to briefly recollect some of Scheler’s main arguments concerning 
the status of “affective life” and then to try a sympathetic appraisal of the 
bearing of these theses.
some interpretations notwithstanding1, scheler’s account of the connection 
between affectivity and axiology does not hinge on the alleged cognitive 
value attributed to feelings, but on the specific role attributed to love. affective 
experience and emotional life are essential in scheler’s account of values, but 
values are not apprehended by any introspective discernment of emotions2. 
feelings (affekte), as passive emotional events, do not reveal values, which are 
rather manifested by passions (leidenschaften)3, and passions require an “active 
devotion” to their object. love is not just different from feeling, but, against 
many contemporary accounts4, is not even to be understood as a sentiment, 
an emotional attitude similar to “like” or “dislike”, insofar as such attitudes 
are essentially reactive, while love is essentially active. in fact, in order to 
understand the meaning of love in scheler’s account we have to fully grasp its 
character of intentional act: love is not just an intentional act among others, but 
is the originary act par excellence (urakt)5.
love is not just the midwife function that allows values to appear, but its 
founding character permeates all levels of cognition. all knowledge is said to 
be tributary to love6, and actually each objective field explored by mankind 
(bίος for biology, φύσις for physics, etc.) is said to be initially set up by love7, 
1 see mulligan, K., “emotions and Value”, in The Oxford handbook of Philosophy of emotion, edited 
by Goldie P., Oxford University Press, 2010 (p. 475-500).
2 scheler m., der formalismus in der ethik und die materiale Wertethik, in Jahrbuch für Philosophie 
und phänomenologische forschung, Halle 1916 (henceforth form.), 64.
3 scheler m., „ordo amoris“, in Schriften aus dem nachlass i: Zur ethik und erkenntnislehre, 
Francke Verlag, Bern, 1957 (p. 345-376) (henceforth Ordo amoris), 73.
4 frijda, n.h., “Varieties of affect: emotions and episodes, moods, and sentiments”, in The 
nature of emotion. fundamental Questions, edited by ekman P. & davidson r., oxford university 
Press, 1994, 74.
5 Ordo amoris, 356.
6 ibid., 356
7 scheler m., „Probleme einer soziologie des wissens“, in die Wissensformen und die gesellschaft, francke 
Verlag, Bern 1960 (5-190), 104.
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that is, by a passionate concern that takes the relevant natural field to be 
revealing of the sense of life and the world. originarily, all phenomena 
appear to the subject as “meaningful signs”, “expressions”, and it is only 
in the wake of this apprehension that objectivity can be progressively 
obtained by a process of steady “disanimation” (entseelung).8
all sensations and representations are said to be possible only in the 
wake of an originating act of love9. The very sense of reality (Wirklichkeit) 
emerges as experience of resistance to an instinctive-impulsive sphere 
of behavior, a sphere which is grounded in love as an embodied 
“teleologically” oriented act10. The very perceptual process is said to 
depend on the axiological disposition, which in turn is grounded on a 
constituting loving attitude11: in the perceptual process the apprehension 
of percepts rests on the preliminary activation of an imaginative 
“stretching forth” (protension), which precedes and not mirrors external 
objects; such imaginative activity is “put to the test” and selected by the 
resistance that the “alterity” of the world exerts against the living drives 
of the embodied subject12. 
at the same time, the very possibility of knowledge (any knowledge) 
implies the recognition of an ontological affinity between subject and 
object: imagination can turn out to be delusional, but it must not be 
trivialized that it can lead to true knowledge. The “awareness of being one” 
(einsfühlung) that scheler thoroughly investigates in Wesen und formen der 
Sympathie signals, among other things, the imagined and perceived affinity 
between personal subjectivity and nature (living nature, but not only). 
This perspective issues in the late definition of knowledge as “relation 
of participation (Teilhabe) of a being to the determinations of a different 
being”13.
Scheler famously defines love as “a movement from the lower value to the 
higher and in which the higher value of an object or a person first flares 
up”14. love, while being an intentional act, is not an act whose object is 
fully defined but is a constitutively “transitional” act, which is inspired by 
possible values of the perceived object. This trait brings love close to the 
8  scheler m., Wesen und formen der Sympathie, francke Verlag, Bern 1973 (henceforth, Symp.), 233.
9 scheler m., „liebe und erkenntnis“, in Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre, francke 
Verlag, Bern 1963 (77-98) (henceforth liebe u. erkenntnis), 96-97.
10 liebe u. erkenntnis, 78 – Ordo amoris, 356.
11 scheler m., „erkenntnis und arbeit“, in die Wissensformen und die gesellschaft, francke Verlag, 
Bern 1960, (191-382) (henceforth erkenntnis u. arbeit), 229, 284.
12 erkenntnis u. arbeit, 315, 346.
13 „Verhältnis des Teilhabens eines Seienden am Sosein eines anderen Seienden“ (die formen des Wissens 
und die Bildung, in Späte Schriften, 111)
14 “[d]ie liebe eine Bewegung ist, die vom niederen zum höheren wert geht und in der jeweilig 
der höhere wert eines gegenstandes oder einer Person erst zum aufblitzen kommt“ (Symp., 155)
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most general notion of preference15, although scheler wants to keep the two 
notions separate. The main difference that scheler underlines between 
love and preference is that preference would take place between values 
(or valued entities) that are already manifest to consciousness, while love 
would hinge on an intentional object whose value is felt, but would also go 
always beyond the present object, in an indeterminate higher direction16. 
Preference is regarded by scheler as a cognitive function directed to values, 
whereas love is not just a cognitive function: love does not address values, 
but individual objects, from which a process is set in motion where values 
primarily come to light. in this process we are not initially in a position to 
tell (i) if the higher value towards which we are directed already exists and 
must be just “discovered”, (ii) if it did not exist yet, but its existence will be 
elicited by our loving attitude, or finally (iii) if we will find no higher value 
at all and the process will turn out to have been delusional17.
love, in contrast with desire, does not tend towards satisfaction, 
appeasement, but is constantly open to novelty18. in fact, according to 
scheler, there is a dimension of “striving for” (Streben) that is essential 
to the emergence of values, but such a striving is wholly indifferent to 
the sphere of ends, goals (Zwecke)19. scheler recognizes in love a plurality 
of levels, which run in parallel with the main levels of the hierarchy of 
values: beyond the primal instinctual-motor (trieb-motorisch) level of 
striving, where pleasure and pain appear, we must recognize a vital (sexual) 
love, a spiritual love (inclusive of the whole cultural sphere) and a personal 
love, which strives for the absolute.20
in scheler’s account love has an essential continuity across all appearances 
and manifestations of the world. at the same time, such continuity 
must not be interpreted as if it revealed an elementary core, a lowest 
common denominator to which all expressions of love should be reduced. 
each expression of love at different levels (sexual, spiritual, etc.) has 
peculiar traits that cannot be considered epiphenomena of an eternal 
substance. Thus, scheler devotes many pages to show why all naturalistic 
interpretations of the varieties of love as results of mechanisms of 
“transmission”, (feuerbach),21 “extension” or “sublimation” (freud)22 of a 




18 liebe u. erkenntnis, 84.
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all pantheistic ideas of love as a form of identification where the beloved 
object would be loved since it would be recognized as originally belonging 
to the subject (as in fichte’s idea of nature).23 That said, however, once the 
reductive attitude is set aside, Scheler does not exclude that a modified 
notion of “sublimation” could be profitably used in ontogenetic and 
historical descriptions,24 granted that such a sublimation can lead to novel 
properties and not just to novel appearances.
The question of the continuity or discontinuity (identity/difference) in the 
“orders of love” across phenomena remains open in scheler’s thought.25 on 
the one hand, the necessity to introduce a sphere of loving acts at the roots 
of all experience appears crucial and is strengthened and cultivated in his 
last years; on the other hand, the phenomenological attention to qualifying 
differences in phenomena constantly warns him against any easy reduction 
of the complexity of intelligible manifestations to a homogenizing principle, 
like Schopenhauer’s Will. The late quasi-dualistic opposition between impulse 
(drang) and spirit (geist) satisfies the theoretical need to account at the same 
time for a unitary constituting value-driven intentionality, which subtends each 
and all meaningful experiences, and for an articulation of irreducible levels 
of love (and experience). in this picture the whole causal weight is assigned by 
scheler to impulse, while spirit is said to be “powerless”, except with regard to 
its power to limit and select the original natural sphere of vital impulse. in late 
texts instinct, impulse, and living energy are all read as love of a kind (eros), 
which requires for its limitation and articulation the exercise of spirit or of love 
of another kind (agape).26
although the overall ontological horizon proposed by scheler remains 
explanatorily patchy and incomplete, its general outlines are clear: the 
very unitariness of the world is conditioned by love,27 whose qualifying 
tendency is towards the absolute (the unconditioned totality, the ens a 
se, god).28 Love is not defined by its tendency towards the Good, however 
defined; rather, the “movement”, the transitional act that love itself is, 
is the good, if anything deserves this name.29 This leads scheler to his 
late vision of the world and its axiological horizon (god) as intrinsically 
dynamic “entities”: god is conceived as a “god in becoming” (werdender 
23 Symp., 129.
24 scheler m., „die stellung des menschen in Kosmos“, in Späte Schriften, francke Verlag, Bern 
1976 (p. 7-71) (henceforth Stellung), 52-53.
25 cf. Zhok, a., intersoggettività e fondamento in max Scheler, Firenze, Nuova Italia 1997, 44-49; 120-
193.
26 Scheler M., Schriften aus dem nachlass iii, Bouvier, Bonn, 1987, 235. - Symp., 103.
27 Ordo amoris, 357-359.
28 Ordo amoris, 355.
29 Symp., 165.
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gott)30 and the world is said not to have a history, but to be a history.31
scheler’s interpretation of the epistemic and ontological role of love, 
which we have briefly summarized, is fascinating and controversial, full 
of exegetic aporias and rich of unexplored suggestions. we have tried 
elsewhere to produce a plausible immanent interpretation of scheler’s 
theory of love and value.32 here, in the following few pages we would like 
to go somehow beyond exegetical faithfulness and try to suggest a way in 
which scheler’s understanding of love can be read as an ontological vision 
with good reasons to be regarded not just as interesting, but even as true, 
insofar as ontological theses are in the spectrum of truthful judgments.
it seems to us that there are three main theses that deserve to be re-
considered and developed. such a re-appraisal must be preceded, however, 
by a preliminary thesis concerning the methodological status of these 
arguments.
2.1. On Scheler’s Phenomenologically Grounded Metaphysical Realism 
as is well-known, scheler’s late theses have been criticized by husserl as a 
relapse into metaphysical naturalism (anthropologism).33 This criticism is 
correct, insofar as scheler does not restrain his theses to what can be expressed 
under epoché, but formulates also hypotheses and theses, with an unashamedly 
metaphysical character of naturalistic brand. The outline of philosophical 
anthropology discussed in the Stellung des menschen im Kosmos is a clear example 
thereof. scheler does not methodologically clarify the reasons that could 
ground the extension of his arguments from the phenomenological sphere 
of intentional objects to ontological assertions concerning the transcendent 
sphere (where his “cosmological” vision certainly belongs). 
That said and granted, i would be inclined to reply that scheler’s main 
philosophical interest, unlike husserl’s, is pre-eminently ethical and this 
intent can be hardly satisfied by a generalized suspension of the commitment 
to reality: the sphere of action constantly requires the passage from the 
certainty of self-evident essential relations to the probabilistic bets of 
decision and enactment. insofar as philosophy is concerned with practical 
reason, it must make room sooner or later for stances concerning the 
transcendent sphere (the “reality in itself”). To be clear, this is no objection to 
30 Stellung, 70.
31 scheler m., „idealismus-realismus“, in Späte Schriften, Francke Verlag, Bern 1976 (183-242), 236.
32 Zhok, op. cit.
33 husserl, e., “Phänomenologie und anthropologie”, in aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937), 
Husserliana XXVII, ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989 (p. 164-
181), 181.
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the methodological validity of epoché, but simply recognizes the legitimacy of 
circumscribed “suspensions of the suspension of judgment”, in the sphere of 
moral philosophy. This is a position with an established  history even outside 
the phenomenological tradition: we can identify it in Kant’s “moral re-
evaluation” of the ideas of pure reason, as well as in Kierkegaard’s (or sartre’s) 
calls for free ethical commitment.
in scheler, his sympathy for religious thinkers notwithstanding, we do not 
find any lighthearted leap towards metaphysical “bets”: his thought is and 
remains based on phenomenological analysis, which provides the sphere 
of essential certainty, from which he sometimes feels obliged to venture 
into metaphysical landscapes dealing with the absolute. in the following, 
admittedly speculative, considerations we will follow this general approach.
2.2. Love and the Inescapability of Teleology
scheler repeatedly underlines the essential connection between knowledge 
and love. his defense of this thesis is sometimes obscured by historical-
philosophical references, like the frequent mention in this regard of 
augustine’s vision, which may raise the suspicion that a theological agenda 
is at work. But this point can be certainly made understandable and 
appealing on immanent grounds.
i would be inclined to defend this thesis along the following lines: each cognitive 
act ultimately relies on differentiation (distinction, discernment) and unification 
(association, synthesis). But each differentiating act, the primal core of which is 
represented by the whole sphere of sensations, is always already expression of a 
preference. This does not imply subjective arbitrariness: we do not decide what we 
feel and discern, we do not decide whether macroscopic luminous differences 
will play a major role and subatomic changes an insignificant one in our primal 
perceptual ordering. nevertheless, it is indubitable that we, as living beings, 
bring differences to the world insofar as they are “meaningful” for us: each 
discerned difference is also a preference. our body perceives insofar as it produces 
a living reaction, which is concerned with and interested in the “stimulus”. 
does it mean that we are bound to be blind to all detectable differences that we 
are not bodily predisposed to grasp? In a sense, certainly not, since there are 
plenty of technological devices, from microscopes to telescopes, that overcome 
the perceptual limitations of our bodily powers. yet, it remains always true 
that there is no knowledge without selection of qualifying objects of interest, 
and this selection is mostly untouched by the technological “amplifications of 
signals”. what we see through microscopes, telescopes and the like is anyway 
selected by “interests” that more or less mediately depend on the prima facie 
valid world of our percepts and actions (lebenswelt). Technology may make us 
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see more, but there is no such a thing as seeing all: all perceiving is selecting.
a similar discourse can be done, with even more evidence, for all synthetic 
performances. it should be evident that there is nothing like an “event”, or a 
“thing”, whose boundaries can be set juxta propria principia. we have, of course, 
no trouble in talking in acceptably unambiguous ways about this event and that 
thing, without quarreling too much about where an event (or thing) begins or 
ends. a dinner, a war, a car-crush, a man, a city, a cup of tea are all items that 
we can approximately define and intend, and only very occasionally a doubt 
may be raised about their boundaries (Was the dinner already over? Is here 
still city or already countryside? Etc.) But the philosophically crucial point 
is that no event or thing is intrinsically determined by any exact amount of 
matter-energy in a specific space-time. no event in the universe has intrinsically a 
beginning or an end: there is not a point in any extensional description where 
an event has objectively ceased to be. we can say that at a certain point an 
explosion does not deserve to be called explosion any more, but objectively we 
could try to go on in our description of its repercussions for ever, understanding 
them as its infinite “parts”. The same can be said for any event whatsoever at 
any level of description: there is no objective intrinsic boundary between an 
event, its causes and its effects. And when we mention the qualifying properties 
that determine the unitariness of a “thing” (cohesion, or solidity, or property 
homogeneity, or concordant translation of its parts, or manipulability, etc.) our 
choice of this or that qualifying property equally depends on our concerns and 
interests (primarily the constitutive concerns and interests that our body is 
predisposed to acknowledge).
much the same can be said by extending our consideration from the “internal 
horizons” (to adopt husserl’s conceptuality) of events and things to their 
“external horizons”, and especially to the overall horizon that we call “the 
world”. The world is no-thing in the world. The constitutive unitariness of the 
world has little to do with physical variables: we do not know, and may never 
ascertain, whether the universe is finite or infinite, whether all its parts are 
physically bound by physical forces (e.g., gravity) or not, but all these factual 
uncertainties have nothing to do with our necessary understanding of the 
world as unitary. The point, again, is that we are teleologically bound to 
connect and grasp together everything that there is (for us), in order to make 
order in it and sense of it.
insofar as we, prima facie, subsume under the expression “love” all preferential 
attitudes, we must grant that all cognition and all phenomena that are relevant 
for us are permeated by “love”. nothing whatsoever in the world can manifest 
itself without being elected (or disregarded) by selective principles that depend 
on our constitutive “interest” in and “passion” for the world and its parts.
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2.3. On the Open Character of Love
in the previous reasoning we have adopted an acceptation of love, which 
may seem to diverge from scheler’s one. But this is not really the case. in 
Scheler’s account the qualifying trait of love is its “open” character, that is, 
its being directed towards something valuable that is not yet known (and 
in fact may never be reached or known). occasionally the “open” character 
of love can be defined by opposition to the “closed” character of instinctual 
satisfaction, in the following sense: when we satisfy hunger our teleological 
impulse is apparently quenched and extinguished, while when we 
passionately love a human being, a form of art, a historical community, etc. 
we are concerned with something that appears in principle inexhaustible. 
However, this opposition is less clear-cut than it could seem at first: in fact 
the (provisional) exhaustiveness of instinctual satisfaction (sexual love 
as well as hunger)  must not conceal the fact that, to the extent that the 
instinctual impulse is unsatisfied, its “target” appears to be inexhaustibly 
interesting, not unlike the “objects” of spiritual love. without denying the 
difference in the relevant acts, the characteristic openness of love is to be 
found in different degrees at any axiological level, from pleasure/pain, to 
vital feelings, to spiritual passion and theological devotion. more generally, 
if we widen our view, we must see that all oriented impulses that animate 
the living subject, from seeking and discerning sensations, to synthesizing 
percepts, to the highest examples of spiritual love do not aim at a settled end, 
but are always openly oriented towards a satisfactory object to be found 
(recognized). Indeed, this description fits all levels of living inclination and 
propensity (preference), and this means that all our living impulses are 
animated by an anonymous “telos” to be possibly discovered over time: we 
learn what is appropriate to quench hunger or sexual arousal, as we equally 
discover newer and newer aspects of the beloved person (art, community, 
etc.). actually, we never exhaust the potentialities of this exploratory 
inclination even at the most immediate and elementary levels: we may 
always discover new forms of satisfaction of “basic biological instincts”, and 
this discovering trend is no privilege of the “highest” and more culturally 
mediated forms of inclination.
This invites us to notice that love, in this radical and extensive sense, 
represents the first core of what appears to the thinking subject as intentionality. 
intentionality, we customarily say, is “aboutness”, is being directed towards 
something, which is our intentional object. usually, we mention intentional 
relations with implicit reference to the reflective sphere, where intentional 
objects are already endowed with a recognizable identity. But, as husserl 
extensively showed, thematic intentional acts (the apprehension of contents) 
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constitutively rely on a “passive” pre-reflective dimension, which represents 
also the first articulation of temporality in the form of “retentions” and 
“protentions”.34 The passive pre-reflective dimension the constitutes inner time-
consciousness is intrinsically “appetitive”, being animated by what husserl calls 
“empty protentions” (leere Protentionen).35  intentionality is then, in a primary 
sense, the intrinsic “orientation-towards” of a living being, without any settled 
object; without this tendency, no proper “aboutness” can subsist. intentionality, 
unlike any physical relation, is a relation that subsists before and in the 
absence of one of the relata. empty protentions describe a “relation” of this 
kind, a relation between a given experience and an unknown merely possible 
experience. if this is the core of intentionality, then the “openness” of love in all 
its instantiations, from sensitivity to interest, from inclination to preference, 
from craving to passion precisely represents this core.
2.4. The “Impotence of Spirit” and the “Works of Love”
The ultimate metaphysical vision that scheler brings forth shows the causal 
energy of drang as the only original power in nature, while geist is not 
reduced to an epiphenomenon just because of its ability to limit, deny and 
select the thrust of drang. history, in the most comprehensive sense, turns 
out to be the emergent result in progress of this “dialectical” process, which 
manifests itself as exploratory cosmological venture.
This picture, which is just sketched in scheler’s last writings, displays in 
outline all the elements of a synthesis of his understanding of “love”. love, by 
which we mean a constitutive drive directed towards something other than 
the loving agent, something unknown but valuable, can be interpreted as the 
deep and inescapable drive that shapes both natural and cultural history. 
analogies notwithstanding, this vision must be clearly distinguished from 
philosophical perspectives like schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will or 
Bergson’s conception of the elàn vital.
unlike schopenhauer, scheler does not think that the highest impulses (like 
spiritual love) have to be ultimately reduced to an elementary blind drive (the 
will): on the contrary, whenever explanation is called for, scheler adopts the 
criterion of explaining the most elementary forms (e.g., the impulses of organic 
life) in the light of the more developed and articulated ones (love), rather than 
the other way round.
unlike Bergson’s elàn vital, scheler’s “love” is not a natural power, in the 
sense that it is not endowed with driving energy of its own, able to “propel” 
34 husserl, e., die Bernauer manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/18), Bernet r. & lohmar d. 
(eds.), husserliana XXXiii, Kluwer, Dordrecht 2001, 169-170.
35 Husserl (2001), 9.
ON sCHeleR’s MeTAPHysICs Of lOVe: AN APPRAIsAl
andrea ZhoK università degli Studi di milano
53
evolutionary trends or physical motions. scheler’s notion of love should be 
rather conceived, in its minimal core, as a qualifying, selective principle, 
which can find realization in a plurality of embodiments in (natural and 
cultural) history.
if we adopt a monistic ontology, as i am inclined to do, we necessarily have 
to attribute also to such a selective principle some physical embodiment, 
and therefore an “energy”, but the point here is that what qualifies “love” 
is neither the quality nor quantity of its physical substrate, but its function, 
which in principle can be supported by a plurality of substrates.
Finally, how could we figure out this selective function? We can hold that 
the preferential attitude inherent in love is the qualifying trait of life as 
such. although naturalistic accounts tend to remove this point, life cannot 
be primarily defined in terms of self-reproducing mechanisms (egoistic genes, 
autocatalytic systems, etc.): whatever chemical self-replicating organization 
we might happen to find, it would not be regarded as life if we could not 
correlate it with “behaviors” interpretable as “preference towards”, “striving 
for”, etc. Symmetrically, should exobiological investigations find bodies devoid 
of self-replicating structures (dna, rna), while displaying behaviors that 
manifest those “living” “preferential” attitudes, we would just update our 
theories and make room for a different form of life.
We acknowledge self-reproduction, self-preservation, etc. as qualifying 
aspects of life because and insofar as these behaviors provide an objectified 
representation of the kind of felt preferences that each of us primarily 
recognizes in the first person. Self-reproduction and self-preservation are 
misleadingly represented by mechanical metaphors: they are primarily 
urges, drives, wants, preferences that exist “beyond-the-present-towards-
the-absent (resp. latent)”. The biological stress on self-reproduction, self-
preservation, etc. seems to focus on endurance, while endurance is at best the 
outcome of successful living, whereas the core point of life is its constitutive 
orientation towards…/rejection of…
in ordinary evolutionary frameworks we could see pain/pleasure of a kind 
(the first axiological level in Scheler’s account) as a primal dimension of 
organized life. we know that a bacterium of escherichia Coli moves upstream 
in a gradient of glucose; this seems to be a patent expression of preference. 
This does not necessarily involve anything like pain/pleasure. if we think, 
as biology invites us to do, of a multicellular organism as originated 
by a symbiotic ensemble of preexistent cells, we could guess that these 
heterogeneous cells fully reach mutual solidarity only when the parts of 
the organism are unified by the sense of pain/pleasure. But whatever our 
favorite theory about the origin of multicellular organisms, the plurality of 
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parts and tissues of an organism do participate in the common project that 
the organism is precisely when they share that basic feeling. Thus, we can 
indeed conceive of pain/pleasure as a first embodiment of value, discovered 
by the preferential attitude that pervades life; this is a level that already 
achieves a dimension of generality: the parts “care” for the whole.
If pain/pleasure represents a first level of value, instantiated by organisms, 
we can regard “vital love” (sexual reproduction) as a further axiological 
dimension and a further embodiment of value brought to light by “love”. 
This is indeed the second axiological locus in scheler’s hierarchy of values.
in fact, this is the level where the ordinary mechanism of natural selection 
is said to be at work. The usual version of this mechanism is that it selects 
and promotes the properties of the phenotype that are more fit to cope 
with the environment. yet, even if this is not always properly appreciated, 
the orthodox truth of natural selection implies that the crucial hurdle 
that the organism has to overcome is not mere environmental fitness, but 
fitness conducive to reproduction (of which survival qualities are a subset). 
But, as already Darwin’s reflections on sexual selection showed, the choice 
of qualities conducive to sexual eligibility appears to be the main source 
of variation of the phenotypic properties to be stabilized. while the simple 
criterion of environmental fitness operates in a restrictive, convergent way, 
that tends towards the survival of few different forms, sexual selection 
seems to be a force that opens up altogether novel ranges of properties, 
not opposed to environmental fitness but irreducible to it. Even in quite 
orthodox evolutionary accounts, sexual selection may be read as the way 
in which room is made for the most gratuitous phenotypic traits: sexual 
love may be plausibly regarded as a primary source of phenotypic novelty. 
we can conceptualize this passage by saying that sexual instinct appears 
as a new embodiment of “love”, an embodiment that rests on the working 
of organisms and opens up in its turn new levels of organization. not 
implausibly, the dimension of “intersubjective” recognition brought to 
light by sexual selection can be regarded as a privileged pathway for the 
emergence of what we call “cultural traits”. Traits that are not immediately 
useful, but are experienced as “interesting” can be socially selected 
and enforced. intersubjective recognition can enforce novel subjective 
expressions, ultimately leading to ethical, aesthetical, religious “virtues”. 
and indeed, it can even create the ground for the acknowledgment of 
truth (objectivity), as ideal point of convergence of all possible subjective 
acceptance.
in this way we can conceive the emergence and establishment of a level 
of spiritual acts, where in turn new forms of love (the “spiritual love” of 
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scheler’s account) can emerge. 
from this level onwards the way in which love can mediately bring forth 
novel embodiments of value is much less speculative and actually coincides 
with mainstream accounts of the cultural history of mankind.
in this framework, history at all its levels can be seen indeed as the 
exploratory journey of “love”. love now appears as a “weak force”, unable 
to determine the traits of the physical infrastructure where it is going 
to be hosted, but nevertheless able to let emerge over time organizations 
more and more capable to choose and determine their own environment. 
“love” not only discovers values, but incidentally brings to light novel 
embodiments of love itself, which thus acquires further qualifications, in an 
indefinitely developing exploration of meaningfulness.
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